|Last Updated: August 28, 2000|
Coming Soon: Improved Evacuation Distance Table
8/30/00- The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) has produced a new and improved evacuation distance chart that supercedes all previous charts in terms of accuracy and ease of use. According to sources, the new TSWG chart has been completely verified by field testing and appears to reconcile many of the innacuracies and conflicts in charts previously distributed by IABTI and ATF. We have been told by a TSWG representative that the new chart is being cleared for release and submitted to the US GPO for printing. If all proceeds to schedule, the new card should be available from the GPO within the next 60-90 days. We will post a copy of the new TSWG chart here at bombsecurity.com as soon as we have received approval for release. Check back soon.
NOTE: The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) is an organization composed of elements from a number of U.S. Government agencies, dedicated to developing technologies for mitigating the threat of terrorism.
8/26/00- A cache consisting of eight bombs contained in clear plastic water bottles was discovered by a local man in a wooded area near Whitney, Oxfordshire. According to reports, the devices were rather sophisticated in design, employing a number of anti-disturbance sensors. Reports further indicate that each device was designed to be activated (or possibly armed) by remote control. British Army ATOs spent almost 48 hours rendering the devices safe.
While no motive has been established, the location of the devices and timing of the discovery suggests that the devices may have been intended for use during the Notting Hill Carnival -- one of the largest multi-cultural festivals in Europe. Police are also investigating similarities in device construction to another IED recently discoverd near Cheltenham.
8/23/00- The August issue of Law & Order magazine features the first published review of the Bomb Countermeasures for Security Professionals (BCSP) CD-ROM since its release in April 2000. In L&O's Download column (pg.17), Law Enforcement Technology Columnist Tim Dees presents his perpective as a former training officer on the program's value as a police instructional tool.
Click "HERE" to view a reprint of the Law and Order review.
Watch for future reviews of the Bomb Countermeasures program in issues of Security Management, Security Letter, and the Journal of Counterterrorism and Security International (Fall 2000 issue).
8/18/00- Two bombs detonated minutes apart in a busy Riga shopping center, resulting in at least 28 injuries. The location of the devices and timing of the detonations suggests that the perpetrators were trying to achieve maximum casualties. According to reports, the devices were placed ten feet apart in a bag storage room on the first floor of the building. The first device had an estimated charge of 2.2 lb. (TNT). The second device was estimated at 200 grams. According to the Baltic News Service, police claim that Hexogen was identified as the main charge in the second device--suggesting a possible link to several apartment bombings in Moscow last year. While terrorists appear to be the most likely perpetrators, authorities are also examining the possibility of organized crime involvement.
NOTE: While most bomb attacks are perpetrated using a single IED, the use of multiple devices appears to be increasing over the past decade. This alarming observation reinforces the importance of NEVER assuming there is only one device in a suspicious object or post-blast situation. Security managers should also consider this enhanced threat during the risk assessment process as a potential influence on risk severity. See Lessons Three, Four, Five, and Ten of the Bomb Countermeasures for Security Professionals CD-ROM for more information on multiple device situations and related planning considerations.
8/18/00- As part of our research for the next version of the Bomb Countermeasures for Security Professionals CD-ROM, we are looking for case examples of untrained security or law enforcement personnel who were injured or killed while trying to move or deactivate a suspect device. These examples will be used to reinforce the importance of not touching or disturbing a suspected IED--regardless of how "simple" it may look. If you are aware of an incident that illustrates this point well, please e-mail us at: email@example.com.
8/17/00- According to reports, a van containing Sri Lankan soldiers stopped briefly to pick up a passenger in the town of Vavuniya (approx. 160 miles north of Colombo). While the vehicle was paused, a bomber (believed to be a member of the LTTE) jumped onto the rear of the van and detonated a bomb strapped to his chest. The blast instantly killed the bomber and a nine-year old girl standing near the vehicle. Three soldiers were also wounded.
NOTE: This method of overt/suicide delivery has been used by the LTTE on multiple occasions, including several assassinations. Other groups employing suicide bombers include Hamas, Hizbollah, Palestine Islamic Jihad, Gama'a al-Islamiya, PKK, and Al-Qaida.
8/15/00- An abandoned ambulance parked near the U.S. Embassy in Manila was towed to a remote location and searched by bomb disposal personnel. No explosives were found. According to reports, security officials identified the white van parked accross the street from the Embassy as suspicious due to its lack of driver and missing license plates. The van was later identified as a government van from the province of Cavite. Initial reports did not indicate if the van appeared to be stolen.
IMPORTANT NOTE: If subsequent investigation reveals that the van was stolen, immediate action should be taken to visibly increase security near the Embassy. Initial descriptions of this event strongly suggest the possibility of a "dry run". Many terrorist groups conduct "dry runs" to evaluate the effectiveness of a possible target's security. In this situation, the terrorists will rehearse a possible attack scenario while being careful not to place any members at risk (for example, parking an empty car without license plates near a target's location). The terrorists will then observe and evaluate the target's response. Additionally, certain types of "dry runs" can actually condition security and police personnel to ignore threat indicators when used for a sustained period of time. See Lessons Seven and Eight of the Bomb Countermeasures for Security Professionals CD-ROM for detailed information on terrorist planning and operational methods, protective countersurveillance, and pre-incident indicators.
8/14/00- We are happy to announce the launch of our new gateway site--CBWarfare.com. The new web site is designed to provide military, intelligence, and domestic prepardness personnel with a central resource for locating information on chemical and biological WMD, CB defense and response. Using the Bombsecurity.com model, CBWarfare.com features a vast array of information organized into departments: news, publications, downloads, contact directories, equipment manufacturer listings, etc.. CBWarfare.com also hosts information on the CABO Chemicals and Agents of Biological Origin Database Systems.
If chemical and biological WMD relates to your activities, be sure to visit www.CBWarfare.com.
8/14/00- A suspected ETA car bomb identified on a highway near the town of Benabarre was blown up in a controlled detonation by Spanish EOD personnel.
8/11/00- Authorities claim that major bomb attack was thwarted in Northern Ireland. According to reports, a van packed with 450-kg. of home-made explosives crashed through a roadblock near the city of Londonderry. Police chased the vehicle to the Irish border where the driver abandoned the van and escaped on foot. Bomb disposal personnel dispatched to the scene neutralized the threat by a controlled explosion.
The perpetrators are most likely an Irish Republican splinter group opposed to the current peace process.
8/10/00- At least ten people were killed and fourteen wounded by a car bomb that detonated in a busy shopping district in Kashmir's capitol. According to reports, a smaller device had detonated first, luring bystanders and journalists to the site of the blast. A second, more powerful car bomb placed in close proximity detonated a short while later causing the majority of the casualties.
NOTE: This case is one example of the terrorist use of "seconday devices." In this scenario, an initial explosion is used to lure bystanders and responders to the location of a second, often more powerful bomb with the intention of causing maximum casualties. In most cases the secondary will be located close to the first blast site. In other cases, terrorists familiar with police evacuation procedures may locate the secondary at a suspected assembly point. As a rule, first responding security and police should evacuate all bystanders as far as possible from the location of a blast until a complete search for secondary devices has been completed. Refer to Lesson Ten of the Bomb Countermeasures for Security Professionals training CD-ROM for detailed information on Post-Blast Response.
8/8/00- At 6:04 P.M. (local time), a bomb detonated at a busy underground walkway near Puskin square in central Moscow. The blast killed seven people and injured 51 others. While emergency responders were arriving on scene, a second device was discovered and rendered safe. According to early reports, the first device appeared to be relatively small (under 1.5kg) and placed haphazardly in front of a theatre ticket kiosk.
While no one has claimed credit for the attack, Russian authorities suspect Chechen rebels.
NOTE: As demonstrated in this incident, even a small IED can have a devastating effect depending on the circumstances of its employment (confinement, density of people, etc.).
8/3/00- According to reports, Palestinian police in the West Bank raided a Hamas explosives laboratory following the arrest of several group members. The explosives seized in the raid (unspecified) are reported to be identical to explosives used in previous Hamas bomb attacks.
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